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Introduction 
In Latin America there is nothing new about 
the debate between those who advocate the 
optimal allocation of economic resources through 
the market mechanism and those who pre-
scribe different degrees of State intervention to 
remedy alleged shortcomings in that allocating 
mechanism: " the invisible hand" versus "State 
control". In recent years, the discussion has 
become fiercer and more polarized, perhaps 
owing to the ineffectiveness of several moder-
ately reformist programmes tried out during 
the 1960s in the favourable conditions created 
by the so-called "Alliance for Progress". 
On the one hand, no doubt influenced by 
the achievements of the Cuban revolution, at 
least in the sense of having created an egalita-
rian society in less than a generation, there is a 
growing number of those who favour transfer-
ring the means of production to the State and 
planning the economy in the light of specific 
objectives. On the other hand, the number of 
adepts of economic liberalism is likewise swel-
ling, so much so that in recent years certain 
circles have apparently rediscovered the neo-
classical theories and have applied them most 
enthusiastically in some countries. Of course, 
these proponents of economic liberalism re-
present quite a broad spectrum, with variations 
in the degree of freedom with which the market 
mechanism is supposed to function. Thus, in 
almost all countries there are now influential 
persons who attach so much importance to that 
mechanism that they almost regard it as an ob-
ject of veneration. 
These two opposing economic viewpoints 
have their counterparts in political theory, and 
this has greatly exacerbated the argument. In 
all the confusion and mutual recrimination, 
more moderate economic approaches have 
been overshadowed, and sometimes altogether 
*Director, Mexico Office of CEPAL. 
silenced. These cover a range of intermediate 
options, and certainly include the set of reform-
ist approaches put forward by the CEPAL se-
cretariat, with shifts in emphasis over time and 
for each particular case in Latin América. 
The supporters of these three approaches 
—liberalism, reformism and the centrally-plan-
ned economy— all argue that the have the best 
answer for speeding up economic and social 
development. Which of them is right? It is dif-
ficult to reply, because unfortunately the social 
sciences —including those concerned with 
economic and social development— unlike the 
natural sciences do not provide precise formu-
lae. It may be that there are different ways of 
achieving the development of the same coun-
try, or that an approach which is acceptable for 
a country with a given set of characteristics is 
not suitable for another. In any event, the ad-
herents of these three approaches have shown 
extraordinary intolerance towards one another, 
in the conviction that theirs is the best solution, 
and this has certainly hindered constructive 
dialogue. 
Worst of all, each group is so sure of being 
right that it does not even take the trouble to 
analyse critically the other approaches, per-
haps in the belief that its own convictions are 
based on theories so self-evident that the others 
are not even worthy of comment. This is at least 
the impression given by the relative silence of 
the CEPAL secretariat on the increasing popu-
larity of neoclassical approaches. Thus the ap-
plication of such approaches in some Latin 
American countries has unleashed emotional, 
not to say visceral, reactions on the part of se-
veral staff members of the CEPAL secretariat,1 
1
 Aníbal Pinto is the staff member who has dealt with 
this topic at greatest length, and he has done so with consi-
derable eloquence. See, tor example, his article "False 
dilemmas and real options in current Latin American de-
ba te" (CEPAL Review, No. 6, second half of 1978, p. 31), in 
which he views the "resurrection" of neoclassical thought 
as a "return to the theories of the past, which some advo-
cates curiously describe as a step forward to the future ... 
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but beyond asserting in various articles that 
economic liberalism has neither a social ho-
rizon nor a time horizon,2 they have not yet 
undertaken a serious critique of those approa-
ches: a situation which it is a matter of urgency 
to remedy. 
1. The articles by Dr. Prebisch on a new 
theory of change 
It is therefore a source of satisfaction that in his 
recent studies pointing towards a new theory of 
change,3 Raúl Prebisch directly tackles this 
issue.4 His critique of the neoclassical theories 
applied to the development of the capitalist 
countries of the Latin American region of the 
periphery falls very much within his interpre-
tation of that development in recent decades, in 
which he describes the essentially imitative 
nature of peripheral capitalism (in contrast 
with the innovative capitalism of the centres) 
and the unequal way in which the fruits 
of increasing productivity are appropriated, 
pointing out how all this contributes to the per-
sistence of a privileged-consumer society and 
the wastage of the potential for accumulation of 
the surplus. Prebisch's criticism of the neoclas-
sical approach largely depends on acceptance 
of his interpretation of the way in which the 
fruits of rising productivity are converted into 
extravagant consumption and the consequent 
insufficient accumulation causes large sectors 
of the population to be marginalized or only 
spuriously employed. 
The following reflections suggest that the 
main points of criticism put forward by Pre-
bisch with regard to the neoclassical approach 
are valid even when divorced from his inter-
pretation of the development of peripheral ca-
pitalism in Latin American countries. 
reminiscent of a movement observable in the history of 
European culture, especially at the end of the last century, 
when the exhaustion of artistic creativity led to a new vogue 
for the Graeeo-Roman heritage as a source of inspiration". 
2 S e e the articles by Raúl Prebisch and Aníbal Pinto in 
CEPAL Review, No. 1, first half of 1976, and the above-
ment ioned article by Aníbal Pinto. 
3
 See the articles by Raúl Prebisch and Aníbal Pinto in 
CEPAL Review, No. 1 (first half of 1976), No. 6 (second half 
of 1978) and No. 7 (April 1979). 
4
 See Raúl Prebisch, "The neoclassical theories of eco-
nomic liberalism", in CEPAL Review, No. 7, April 1979, pp. 
167-188. 
2. The many conflicting demands of 
development 
Nowadays almost everyone will admit that a 
development process calls for high rates of eco-
nomic growth and that the benefits of that 
growth must spread through all the strata of the 
population. In order to achieve high rates of 
development, high rates of accumulation are 
necessary and, consequently, some austerity in 
consumption. To these exigencies relating to 
saving and investment, austere consumption 
and an equitable distribution of the benefits of 
growth, many authors —including Prebisch 
himself— add that of democratic liberalism, on 
the grounds that the enjoyment of traditional 
individual freedoms is an inherent part of the 
concept of wellbeing pursued through devel-
opment. 
Doubts may be entertained as to the feasi-
bility of achieving more or less simultaneously 
a steady rise in accumulation (and hence eco-
nomic growth) together with an improved dis-
tribution of income and respect for the indivi-
dual freedoms which accompany a liberal de-
mocratic approach. However, this is essentially 
what is aimed at in the set of guiding principles 
formulated by the CEPAL secretariat over the 
last 30 years. In any event, it should be recog-
nized that there may be worthwhile trade-offs 
in securing one of these major objectives, in the 
short or even medium run, in order to achieve 
the proposed development. 
Thus, for example, those who advocate a 
centrally-planned economy are prepared to 
forego democratic liberalism, at least during an 
initial period, in the interests of growth and 
equity, even placing the emphasis on the latter. 
On the other hand, the supporters of the neo-
classical approach are prepared to forego equi-
ty over the short and medium term (even 
though they may consider this "painful") in 
order to stimulate accumulation and growth. In 
other words, equity is sacrificed to growth, on 
the assumption that in a dynamic context the 
benefits of growth will spread throughout all 
the population strata, thus leading progressive-
ly to prosperity for all. In addition, a growing 
volume of literature argues that the neoclas-
sical approach implies foregoing democratic li-
beralism, again only for a time, since the social 
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tension arising from the sacrifice of the objec-
tive of equity means that an autocratic govern-
men t is necessary to ensure that these pres-
sures are kept under control.5 Indeed, it is this 
twin sacrifice of both equity and democratic 
liberalism which has kindled the wrath of those 
who uphold some version of the reformist theo-
ries of development. The experience gathered 
so far suggests that in those Latin American 
countries where the neoclassical approach has 
been applied, with varying degrees of strict-
ness, the economic growth achieved has failed 
to benefit large strata of the population, and 
autocratic governments, whose ideological 
stamp is well known, have been necessary to 
apply the chosen economic policy. 
3. Viability of economic liberalism in the 
Latin American context 
Can it not be contended, however, that eco-
nomic development is complex and painful, 
and that after a period of sacrifice, as envisaged 
in the neoclassical approach, these shortcom-
ings will be resolved in the medium or long 
term? In the last analysis, the argument ad-
duced consists in reiterating that that is how the 
capitalist centres developed, and that there is 
no reason whatsoever why the capitalist 
per iphery should not develop in the image and 
likeness of the centres. 
Those who argue along these lines appar-
ently forget not only that the economic liberal-
ism which fostered the development of the 
United States of America and the major Euro-
pean countries was heavily tempered by an 
increasing degree of State intervention from 
the second half of the nineteenth century on-
wards {inter alia, in the form of provision of 
social security, regulation of the behaviour of 
the main economic agents and, in the present 
century, application of an increasingly progres-
sive tax system), but also that the conditions in 
which the industrial revolution took place were 
5
 See Guillermo O'Donnell , "Reflexiones sobre las ten-
dencias de cambio del Estado burocrático-autoritario", in 
Revista Mexicana de sociología, vol. XXXIX, No. 1, Janua-
ry-March 1977, pp. 9%59; and Pedro Vuskovic, "América 
Latina: la crisis de un patrón de desarrollo y sus consecuen-
cias políticas", in Comercio Exterior, vol. 25, No. 12, Mexi-
co City, December 1975. 
radically different from those prevailing today 
in the capitalist countries of contemporary 
Latin America. The situations differ in at least 
five respects : ( 1) the noteworthy consequences 
of the increasing importance of scientific and 
technological progress; (2) the demographic 
picture; (3) the role of domestic demand; (4) the 
organization of the international economy; and 
(5) the clear differences between the value sys-
tems and the political and cultural heritage of 
the central countries of yesteryear and the pe-
ripheral countries of today. 
The revolution in scientific and technolog-
ical development —the first of the factors 
listed above— is something fundamentally as-
sociated with the centres but imitated by the 
periphery. Thus the periphery, either from the 
need to compete in international markets or 
simply from emulation, tends to incorporate 
increasingly capital-intensive technology into 
its production processes, contrary to what 
would be warranted by its relative endowment 
of resources. Again, consumerism in the peri-
phery is eminently imitative, and by no means 
limited to the high-income strata. The develop-
ment of the mass media —another technolog-
ical innovation which did not exist in the 
centres in the nineteenth century— has been 
most effective in imposing consumption pat-
terns which have very little to do with the pro-
duction capacity of the peripheral economies 
or, necessarily, with the quality of life of their 
inhabitants. Finally, another consequence of 
technological development has been the de-
cline in mortality and, to a lesser extent, mor-
bidity rates. This partly accounts for the second 
feature which distinguishes the periphery of 
today from the centre a century ago, and to 
which we shall return shortly: namely, popula-
tion growth. 
The countries which are now in-
dustrialized never had to face these difficulties. 
While the development of a broad market for 
consumer goods and services became the main 
engine of growth of those societies, their popu-
lations did not give free rein to imitative con-
sumerism as do those of the peripheral 
countries today, thus contributing, among 
other things, to balance-of-payments and sav-
ing problems. Again, the central countries 
achieved their development by employing 
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technology more or less geared to their re-
source endowment , and while there were well-
documented cases of human exploitation, these 
never reached the extremes of margination cur-
rent in the Latin American countries today. 
Turning now to the second element —the 
population factor— we can distinguish a funda-
mental difference between the centres a 
hundred years ago and the periphery at pre-
sent. None of the currently developed 
countries had to face up to population growth 
rates even remotely similar to those now pre-
vailing in Latin America. The existence of a 
large sector of the population which is unemp-
loyed or underemployed (the so-called 'reserve 
army') contrasts markedly with the situation of 
labour scarcity in most of the industrialized 
countries during their period of most intensive 
transformation; a circumstance which unques-
tionably spurred the development of inven-
tions directed towards raising productivity per 
person employed. The fact that the Latin 
American population is growing at faster rates 
than the economies can productively absorb 
produces various kinds of problems. First, the 
existence of a large supply of 'cheap' labour led 
most of the Latin American countries to enter 
world trade with labour-intensive products, 
thus making use of their comparative ad-
vantages. This is a position qualitatively dif-
ferent from that occupied by the central coun-
tries, as is pointed out below. Second, the im-
plantation of 'modern' activities in the Latin 
American peripheral countries, far from ab-
sorbing an increasing percentage of the popula-
tion, has led to a technological duality which 
has contributed greatly to the unfair distribu-
tion of income. Third, the fact that a small group 
could exploit large quantities of cheap labour, 
combined with the problem of marginality it-
self, also helped to shape the power structure 
typical of most countries of the region, by 
weakening the bargaining capacity of the 
wage-earners, in contrast with what is happen-
ing in the industrialized countries. For exam-
ple, one of the reasons behind the difference 
be tween the Costa Rican society and the other 
Central American economies must be that un-
like what occurred in the other countries, dur-
ing its colonial period Costa Rica had a small 
population, both in absolute terms and in rela-
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tion to the land factor, and this led to the 
establishment of production units (small land-
owners) which were different from those of the 
other countries. Fourth, the fact that a large 
percentage of the population is virtually ex-
cluded from the market economy leads to a very 
warped production structure primarily catering 
to the demand of the higher income groups. 
And this brings us to a third fundamental differ-
ence between the central economies, past and 
present, and the economies of the periphery. 
One of the main props underpinning the 
central capitalist economies is a broad con-
sumer market. I t is widely realized that for the 
system to function properly there must be a 
high level of demand and that furthermore this 
demand must develop dynamically. In turn, 
this high level of demand implies a wide range 
of investment opportunities in a great variety of 
goods and services. In contrast, regrettably, it 
seems that in the majority of the Latin Ameri-
can countries the working of the system in-
volves, at least implicitly, other requirements 
which take priority over the desirability of 
broad-based, dynamic demand; chief among 
these is the need for a large supply of cheap 
labour in order to maintain an acceptable level 
of competitiveness in world trade. Nor is it 
surprising that the dominant groups in society 
are more interested in their short-term objec-
tive of holding down wages as part of the dis-
tribution pattern than in the long-term objec-
tive of expanding the domestic market. All this 
also means that investment opportunities are 
limited, which certainly fosters consumption of 
luxury goods and investment in fields of 
limited social profitability, such as real estate.'* 
For the above reasons, the cyclical fluctuations 
in the central economies have traditionally 
been linked with the growth of domestic de-
mand. In contrast, in the Latin American 
periphery the sometimes abrupt swings bet-
ween relative prosperity {for a few) and reces-
sion are much more closely linked with the 
performance of the external sector. 
The external sector is indeed the fourth 
factor distinguishing the Latin American 
'' Mention should also he nuule of the opening of sav-
ings accounts abroad, the reasons for which are more comp-
lex than the mere lack of investment opportunities. 
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countries of today from the central countries in 
the past. It is not so much a question of the 
degree of openness of their economies as of 
their position in world trade. There is an 
abundant bibliography on this question, in-
cluding ground-breaking studies by the 
CEPAL secretariat showing that the Latin 
American countries depend heavily for their 
exports on products whose income-elasticity of 
demand is relatively low, whereas the indus-
trialized countries exported and continue to 
export goods for which demand is extremely 
dynamic. Even if this circumstance should 
change in the future —there might be a rising 
t rend in the value of raw materials, food pro-
ducts and non-renewable resources— it is 
qui te obvious that the international economy 
today is not what it was in the second half of the 
n ineteenth century, and many of the new fea-
tures which characterize the contemporary in-
ternational economy run counter, in the last 
analysis, to the interests of the peripheral coun-
tries. In brief, the Latin American countries 
today are faced with much more serious prob-
lems in the international economy, and are 
much more dependent on the external sector, 
than was the case for the United States of 
America and most of the European countries 
dur ing the last 150 years. Hence the famil-
iar demands of the Third World, which aim 
at the so-called New International Economic 
Order. 
Finally, the differences in the scale of val-
ues of the central countries of the past century 
and the Latin American countries today are re-
levant to this cursory analysis. Democratic 
liberalism has a long tradition in almost all the 
countries of the capitalist centre, which made 
possible among other things the effective or-
ganization of different interest groups, includ-
ing the trade unions. All this led to a more 
balanced power structure than that existing in 
most Latin American countries today. Further-
more, in the former countries the role of the 
State was traditionally to avoid excesses and 
ensure orderly development as regards civil 
and political rights, but this has not always 
been true in Latin America. Instead, the Latin 
American countries, although adopting all the 
trappings of democratic liberalism upon attain-
ing economic independence, at the same time 
inheri ted economic and social structures which 
reinforced inequality, and did not have a tradi-
tion of civil and political rights. In sum, in the 
central capitalist countries for some 200 years 
or more there was a movement towards broader 
popular participation in national life, includ-
ing, of course, economic life; such a movement 
existed in only a few Latin American countries, 
however, and instead the heritage of the past, 
as reflected in the present power structure, 
tended in the opposite direction. 
It is no accident that these fundamental 
differences between the central countries of 
the late nineteenth century and the Latin 
American countries of today lead to the very set 
of features described by Prebisch in his criti-
que of the neoclassical approach: a very ine-
quitable distribution structure which is no-
thing less than the reflection of an unfair power 
structure; a level of accumulation which is too 
low to absorb the labour force productively, 
partly owing to the wastage implied by the 
privileged-consumer society on the one hand 
and by the existence of redundant labour on the 
other; and the tendency towards what the au-
thor calls the 'external bottleneck' in the pat-
tern of economic relations between the central 
and peripheral countries. 
Of course, the trends of recent years may 
change in the future, so that conceivably at 
least the economies of the Latin American 
periphery might develop along lines compar-
able to those followed by the central economies 
in the past. For example, it is possible that, 
against all the present evidence, agreement 
might be reached on a new international 
economic order which would allow the de-
veloping countries to gain a better foothold in 
the world economy, or simply that the products 
exported by Latin America might rise in 
value. It is also possible that the very advance 
of science and technology which in the past 
affected mortality rates may now affect fertility 
rates, thus reducing the pace of population 
growth, although the passage of a generation 
would be required for the effects of this 
circumstance to make themselves felt in a re-
duction in the growth rate of the labour force. 
Altogether, however, what is clear is that if the 
trends of the recent past continue there is no 
reason whatsoever to suppose that the 
dynamism of the industrial revolution can be 
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repeated in the Latin American countries, 
where economic, social and political condi-
tions, at both the domestic and the external 
level, are fundamentally different. In other 
words, there is no reason for believing that the 
Latin American countries can reproduce the 
experience of the United States or Europe. 
Hence the conclusion may be drawn that 
the neoclassical approach being tried out in 
some countries of the region does not offer 
much hope of success. In the first place, it in-
volves a sacrifice of some subjective but widely 
accepted values such as distributional equity 
and, apparently, democratic liberalism. Sec-
ondly, there are no grounds whatsoever for sup-
posing that the Latin American countries today 
can repeat the striking successes achieved by 
the United States of America and the European 
countries over the last 150 years. 
1. These comments refer almost exclusively to 
the political aspects of the latest articles by 
Raúl Prebisch. This should not be taken to 
mean that the economic or social aspects of 
what he proposes are considered less im-
portant; but it is in the political field that the 
present author considers he can contribute to 
the cri t ique of the proposal. It should also be 
pointed out that the following comments on the 
political aspect by no means underrate the 
need for development problems to be ap-
proached from a standpoint which does justice 
to their multidisciplinary nature. It must be 
recognized, therefore, that the studies in ques-
tion have the merit of approaching the issue 
from an angle broad enough to make it possible 
to argue that the development process should 
signify greater accumulation and at the same 
time a fairer distribution of the surplus ac-
cumulated, all within a framework which pre-
serves a liberal political system. 
2. This last exigency is a second merit of 
the proposal, in view of the constant attention 
*Staf'f member of the Mexico Office of'CEPAL. 
4. implications for future studies 
The preceding review, extremely cursory and 
unquestionably partial, is only one of many 
possible ways of undertaking the critical 
analysis of the neoclassical approach applied to 
the development of the Latin American 
countries. At all events, it identifies clearly the 
areas calling for further research: the present 
and foreseeable performance of the external 
sector, the formation of the surplus and ac-
cumulation, marginality, the distribution 
structure, power relations, what Prebisch calls 
'privileged' and 'imitative' consumerism, and 
the application of science and technology to 
development. All these aspects are interming-
led in one way or another in the above-
mentioned studies by Prebisch, and it is to be 
hoped that the CEPAL staff will rise to the 
challenge and continue this fruitful analytical 
work. 
paid throughout to the importance of power 
relations in the development process. Thus, 
the proposal is consubstantial with the in-
tellectual tradition of political economy, a tra-
dition which today has regrettably been seri-
ously undermined by the artificial academic 
separation of the two disciplines. 
3. This importance attached firstly to 
power relations and secondly to political 
liberalism gives rise to one of the criticisms 
which can be made of Dr. Prebisch's proposal. 
For after power relations have been turned into 
one of the key explanatory factors of the de-
velopment process, by the time one reaches the 
actual proposal put forward in "Towards a 
theory of change" political aspects no longer 
possess, in this later section at least, the import-
ance attributed to them in the earlier part. It is 
never made clear exactly which of the con-
stituent elements of political liberalism is 
meant: the existence of political parties, or a 
strict separation of powers with a self-
regulating balance attained through a system of 
checks and counterchecks among the different 
branches of government which prevents possi-
ble abuses of power by any one of them. Nor is 
Comments by Isaac Cohen* 
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anything said of how basic freedoms, such as 
the rights of information and association, can be 
preserved in a system which sets out to restrict 
forcibly the consumption of some strata. In 
other words, how can the social appropriation 
of the surplus be achieved while preserving 
political freedoms? 
4. The foregoing may perhaps be due to 
the fact that strictly speaking the political as-
pects are not part of the view of development 
on which the proposal is based. If it is admitted 
that development is conceived as "an endless 
superimposition of technological layers char-
acterized by increasing productivity and effi-
ciency upon preceding technological layers 
where productivity and efficiency are lower"; 
and that "in the course of this process the latter 
tend to disappear; and the labour force which 
was employed in them is mainly transferred to 
technological layers of increasing productivity 
and efficiency, promoting the homogeneity of 
the structure",1 the question arises: where do 
political exigencies fit into this view of devel-
opment? Perhaps this conception of develop-
ment would be more consistent with the pro-
posal if it included the changes in the power 
structure necessary for this orderly superimpo-
sition of the layers of technology to take place. 
5. Another criticism that can be made of 
the proposal stems from the view of politics 
upon which it is based. It is stated that power 
relations are not subject to any regulating 
'"Socio-economic structure and crisis oi peripheral 
capitalism", in CEPAL Review, No. 6, second half of 1978, 
p. 197. 
principle whatsoever, and are not based on 
considerations of equity, for these are alien to 
the operation of the system.2 Now, if the pre-
sent system is criticized for this shortcoming, it 
may therefore be asked: what agency is going to 
b e responsible for providing the criteria of 
equity, with what legitimacy and with how 
much power to impose them? Unfortunately, 
the proposal as stated does not answer these 
questions. Or, to put it another way, it appears 
to posit the existence of a political system in 
which equity is brought in from outside by 
some unidentified agency, without any men-
tion of what power that agency possesses for so 
doing. 
6. Perhaps a different conception of polit-
ics might help to throw light on these doubts 
arising from a reading of the proposal. Every 
political system may be understood as a tacit so-
cial contract between governors and governed, 
whose terms are constantly being put to the test 
in order to discover the limits of obedience and 
revolt.3 Accepting this conception of politics, 
the conclusion must be drawn that the intro-
duction of a different principle of equity from 
that prevailing in a given political system re-
quires the transformation of the power 
structure. This in turn calls for a study of the 
different actors in the political system, and of 
the alliances which should be made in order to 
build up sufficient power to enable the new 
criteria of equity to prevail. 
2Ibid.,p. 160. 
•'This idea is taken from Barrington Moore, Injustice: 
The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, New York, 
M.E.Sharpe, 1978, p. 18. 
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Comments by Fernando Fajnzylber 
Introduction 
T h e articles by Raúl Prebisch to which the fol-
lowing comments refer1 are in our view particu-
larly stimulating, since the author: 
(i) Focuses attention and emphasis on 
some important endogenous aspects which 
he lp to explain the functioning of the Latin 
American economies; 
(ii) Analyses the development of the pe-
riphery as an integral part of capitalism taken as 
a whole, and endeavours to build a bridge bet-
ween strictly economic matters and political 
and social questions; 
(iii) Openly challenges not only certain 
'truths fashionable in the region', but also his 
own earlier propositions; 
(iv) Seeks to draw normative conclusions 
from his interpretation. 
Precisely because these conclusions are 
founded on the interpretation, it would seem 
particularly important to analyse the interpre-
tative phase in depth. Such an analysis is at-
tempted below, though very schematically, in 
these critical comments which basically refer 
to the main subjects with which Raúl Pre-
bisch's articles deal, namely: 
— The imitative nature of peripheral cap-
italism; 
— T h e surplus, the structure of produc-
tion and accumulation; 
— The system's tendency towards crisis; 
— Neoclassical theories and economic 
policy; 
— Towards a theory of change. 
•Co-Director of the NAFINSA-UNIDO Joint Capital 
Goods Project (Mexico City). 
1
 "Socio-economic structure and crisis of peripheral 
capitalism", Cepal Review, No. 6, second half of 1978; 
"The neoclassical theories of economic liberalism", Cepal 
Review, No. 7, April 1979; "Towards a theory of change" 
(preliminary inimeo version of the article which appears in 
Cepal Review, No. 10; the quotations here are taken from 
this preliminary version, and therefore may not exactly 
correspond to the text published in the Review). 
1. The imitative nature of peripheral 
capitalism 
The great importance the author attaches to this 
aspect is made clear as follows : 
"Peripheral capitalism is essentially imita-
tive, in contrast with the innovative capitalism 
of the centres. Under the hegemony of these 
latter, it opens its doors wider and wider to their 
capital and to their techniques; to their con-
sumption patterns and other cultural manifes-
tations; to their ideas, ideologies and institu-
tions".2 
However, in specifically analysing the op-
eration of the model, he focuses attention al-
most exclusively on the imitation of patterns of 
consumption, as an important factor in explain-
ing the lack of dynamism: "The exclusive ten-
dency is due above all to the increasing imita-
tion of the centres ' patterns of consumption, as 
well as to the siphoning-off of peripheral in-
come by the centres. All this occurs at the ex-
pense of a capital accumulation process which 
ought to be much more intensive than that 
which takes place within the limited sphere of 
the privileged-consumer society".' 
Queries 
In view of the importance the author attaches to 
this aspect, it would seem useful to add a few 
observations concerning both the concept and 
its implications. 
(i) The tendency towards homogenization 
of consumption patterns is more a characteris-
tic of the contemporary world economy than a 
specific feature of Latin American develop-. 
ment. The spread of the 'American way of life' 
throughout the developed countries and to the 
continents on the periphery as well is some-
thing that has its origin not only, perhaps, in the 
advertising phenomenon but also in the emerg-
L
 "Socio-economic structure and crisis of peripheral 
capitalism", op. cit., p. 173. 
,!
 "Towards a theorv of change", op. cit. 
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ence of forms of mass consumption which, for 
special historical reasons, flourished particu-
larly in the United States. 
(ii) An important aspect of Raúl Prebisch's 
argument stresses the fact that this imitative 
consumption basically occurs in a small sector 
at the peak of the income pyramid. Recent re-
search in two large countries in the region, 
Brazil and Mexico, shows that specific items 
which can be classed under this head of 'imita-
tive consumption' have achieved a high degree 
of penetration among the urban population as a 
whole. This would seem to be due to the fol-
lowing factors: a shift in the structure of con-
sumption in favour of these items, the develop-
ment of consumer finance machinery, and a 
decl ine in the relative prices of the goods in 
question as compared with those traditionally 
consumed.4 Since a high proportion of these 
modern goods come from the transnational 
corporations, the conclusion must be reached 
that it is necessary to qualify, in accordance 
with the sectors of production, the frequent 
assertion —which we formerly endorsed— that 
these enterprises produce essentially for the 
high-income sectors.5 If one grants that the phi-
losophy followed by these firms is eminently 
pragmatic, and that one of their basic objectives 
is to expand the market, it is understandable 
that they should use their influence to bring the 
population's pattern of consumption into line 
with the goods which they know how to pro-
duce . Irrespective of the ethical judgement 
these facts may provoke, it is vital to recognize 
the existence of this phenomenon, whose im-
portance goes beyond the strictly economic 
sphere . 
(iii) In emphasizing 'imitative consump-
tion', the author leaves out an area where Latin 
America does appear to present highly specific 
4
 See John Wells, "The diffusion of durables in Brazil 
and its implications for recent controversies concerning 
Brazilian development", Cambridge Journal of Econo-
mics, vol. 1, No. 3, New York, September 1977; "Algunas 
interrelaciones entre redistribución del ingreso y el nivel 
de crecimiento del producto y del empleo", in Proyecto de 
Planificación ij Promoción del Empleo (MEX 75/007), pro-
visional text, June 1977. 
' 'Obviously, it would be difficult to maintain that this 
assertion is valid for specific items of clothing, some house-
hold appliances, certain foodstuffs and beverages, cosmet-
ics and some pharamaceutical products, plastic utensils, 
and so on. 
features; we refer to the structure of production 
by means of which the above-mentioned pat-
tern of consumption is satisfied. It is an indis-
putable fact that, after the Second World War, 
the 'Western' pattern of consumption penetra-
ted countries such as Korea and Japan, but 
without leading to the transplantation of large 
numbers of firms from the West to produce 
such goods. The existence of powerful local 
bourgeoisies, with specific plans in view for 
the country, together with a variety of other 
familiar historical and cultural factors, made it 
possible to reconcile the imitative pattern of 
consumption with a structure of production 
whose centre of gravity was to be found in local 
groups which were capable of competing inter-
nationally — even in those markets where the 
goods had originated. The growing efficiency 
achieved by these structures of production, 
strictly protected for substantial periods, made 
it possible to reduce costs and sharply expand 
the domestic market for these 'copied' goods. 
Hence can be inferred the relative weak-
ness of those analyses which endeavour to ex-
plain the lack of dynamism by concentrating 
exclusively on the high level of protection. 
This suggests that it is important to introduce 
into the analysis the factors accounting for the 
mould in which the domestic structure of pro-
duction is cast and, in particular, the role 
played by the domestic entrepreneurial sector, 
directly and through the State. 
2. The surplus, the structure of production and 
accumulation 
The distribution of the surplus plays a central 
role in Prebisch's analyses: 
"This dynamic is based on a structural 
phenomenon to which we have attributed deci-
sive importance: the surplus. 
"A fairly large proportion of the fruits of 
technical progress remains in the hands of the 
owners of the means of production in the form 
of a surplus, and this occurs at the expense of 
the labour force disadvantaged by market laws 
because oí the social heterogeneity of periph-
eral capitalism. "'' 
h
 "Towards a theory of change", op. cit. 
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A central element in the analysis is what he 
terms the struggle for distribution (of the sur-
plus), its impact on accumulation and inflation, 
and the effect of inflation on the political pro-
cess and, in particular, on what he refers to as 
the tendency towards a "crisis of the system". 
Queries 
(i) The structure of production and the 
surplus. 
In this paragraph attention is focused on 
the magnitude of the surplus and its links with 
the structure of production, this latter being a 
subject to which the author makes practically 
no reference. His central concern is the dis-
tribution of the surplus, over time, between the 
sectors which own the means of production and 
the labour force, and this distribution struggle 
is expressed in terms of the relationship bet-
ween growth of productivity and growth of 
earnings. If productivity grows faster than earn-
ings, the surplus will increasingly be channel-
led towards the owners of the means of'produc-
tion. Here the author does not inquire into the 
factors which determine the level of produc-
tivity and its evolution over time, and for this 
reason does not need to introduce into his anal-
ysis the aspects referring to the structure of 
production. This omission with regard to the 
structure of production becomes important in 
the normative phase, however, precisely when 
the author suggests machinery whereby the 
distribution of the surplus can be substantially 
modified. 
Among the factors which determine the 
overall productivity level are the sectoral struc-
ture and the type of enterprise existing in each 
of the sectors. Rises in productivity are caused 
by alterations in the sectoral structure and by 
changes in the balance between modern and 
traditional enterprises within each of the sec-
tors. Even if productivity were to remain con-
stant in each of the sectors, overall productivity 
would increase to the extent that the higher-
productivity sectors grow faster than the others. 
Furthermore, productivity per enterprise may 
remain constant, but for modern enterprises to 
grow more rapidly than the rest is enough to 
raise productivity in each sector, and conse-
quently overall productivity. If the above pic-
ture is rounded out by introducing technical 
progress and the economic policy context in 
which productive activity is pursued (protec-
tion, State intervention, market structure), this 
will supply a rough guide to the forces which 
account for the increase in productivity. In this 
way it can be confirmed empirically that there 
is a direct relationship between the growth rate 
of the product and the productivity increment. 
In other words, the rate of introduction of tech-
nical progress by enterprises and intra- and in-
ter-sectoral changes become more intensive 
with the growth of the economy as a whole. 
Consequently, the characteristics of the 
structure of production and the changes it un-
dergoes are of fundamental importance in ex-
plaining the evolution of productivity over 
t ime, but they also exert a direct influence on 
the growth of earnings. The relative incidence 
of modern enterprises, the relative weight of 
sectors which are more or less concentrated in 
urban areas, and the growth rate of economic 
activity, in addition to historical and cultural 
factors and the size and growth rate of the popu-
lation, directly influence the capacity of the 
labour force to exert pressure in the distribu-
tion struggle to which the author refers. 
It is clear from the above considerations 
that Prebisch's neglect of the structure of'pro-
duction and almost exclusive concentration on 
the distribution of the surplus not only prevent 
him from dealing with the wide variety ofsitua-
tions in Latin American countries, but also 
limit the scope for enlarging upon the proposal 
made in the normative phase ofhis article. 
(ii) Surplus and accumulation. 
Throughout the various articles runs the 
idea, conveyed with greater or lesser explicit-
ness, that there seems to be a direct relation-
ship between the volume of the surplus and the 
rate of accumulation. 
" In order to understand it one must re-
member the two opposite movements from 
which the total amount of the surplus results. 
On the one hand, it is increased by new pro-
ductivity increments which are only partially 
transferred to the labour force. On the other 
hand, it is reduced by the process of sharing just 
mentioned. 
"The dynamics of the system require that 
the total surplus resulting from these opposed 
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movements should grow constantly in order to 
satisfy the consumption requirements of the 
privileged strata and the corresponding re-
quirements for accumulation.'^ 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of specific 
analysis of the Latin American countries —and, 
most importantly, where there is an intention to 
make proposals for an alternative form of de-
velopment— it would seem useful to add a few 
qualifications of this proposition, which, it may 
be noted, is a central element in Prebisch's 
thinking. 
If productivity grows faster than wages, an 
increasing proportion of the surplus will be 
channel led towards the owners of the means of 
production; once the size of the surplus is de-
termined, the amount available for investment 
in the private sector will depend on the tax 
burden, consumption by the recipients of the 
surplus, and the proportion of the surplus 
which is remitted abroad as payment for exter-
nal factors. Assuming that the net sum of re-
sources available in the country is increasing, 
and that there has been no appreciable decline 
in the product-capital ratio, a situation will 
arise where the decision to invest will depend 
on the real investment opportunities capable of 
generating a satisfactory rate of return. In other 
words, the hypothesis that higher growth of 
productivity than of wages implies an increase 
in the rate of private profit is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for accumulation. In 
some Latin American countries, during periods 
of social tension, and when prospects for the 
entrepreneurial sector appear unfavourable, it 
has been observed that high rates of private 
profit are reached which are not translated 
into domestic investment. This also seems to 
happen in some countries of the region where 
drastic changes have been made in protection-
ist policy, reducing opportunities for invest-
ment in those sectors of production that are 
exposed to international competition, and lim-
iting accumulation to financial assets, frequen-
tly speculative in nature, and to non-tradeable 
sectors (construction, recreational services and 
tourism). In cases where the share of wages has 
fallen, too, the increase in the surplus may have 
'•Ibid. 
failed to be reflected in productive accumu-
lation. 
3. The system's tendeney towards crisis 
The author maintains, in the first place, that 
there is a relationship between the nature of 
the system and the outbreak of the crisis, and 
locates the crisis at an advanced stage of the 
development process: 
"I have maintained that the process of de-
velopment heads for a crisis because of the very 
nature of the systems; and this tendency arises 
in advanced stages of the process. It is true that 
the initial phases are characterized by exclu-
sive phenomena, but those conflictive phe-
nomena which play such an important role in 
the outbreak of the crisis have not yet emerged 
with sufficient intensity".8 
Consequently, the distribution struggle 
will be intensified during the process of de-
velopment, and this, in specific circumstances, 
will intensify pressure from the labour sector. 
"As changes take place in the social struc-
ture, however, the trade-union and political 
power of that disadvantaged labour force 
allows it gradually to remedy the weakness of 
its ability to obtain its share, and likewise the 
inadequacy of the system's absorption capac-
ity. Thus it improves its private consumption 
and its consumption of State services, but it 
does so, as has been shown, at the expense of a 
growth rate of the surplus superior to that of the 
product".9 
As a result of this tendency, a time will 
come when earnings grow at the same rate as 
productivity. 
"Accordingly, as these various forms of 
participation evolve, a moment is reached at 
which the growth rate of the surplus becomes 
equal to that of the product, and the greater the 
extent to which political or trade union power 
spreads to the lower strata, the sooner will that 
moment occur. This is the limit beyond which 
the participation of the disadvantaged labour 
force cannot go without causing trouble, under 
the sway of market laws."1" 
»lbid. 
' '"Socio-economic structure and crisis of peripheral 
capitalism", op. cit., p. 180. 
"'Ibid.,?, 181. 
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In the face of this trend, the entrepreneu-
rial sector would have the option of resorting to 
price increases as a compensatory mechanism. 
"There are, however, institutional mecha-
nisms whereby the owners of capital can re-
coup themselves for the decrease in the surp-
lus: the same whereby they were able to appro-
priate the structural surplus [a concept whose 
meaning is not specified — F. F.] and retain it 
indefinitely in their hands. These are monetary 
mechanisms, and however strong the opposi-
tion put up by the responsible authority, the 
economic and political power of the owners of 
capital prevails in the end".11 
This in turn will lead to an intensification 
of labour pressures. 
"This reaction on the part of the privi-
leged-consumer society is not slow to bring 
with it a counter-reaction on the part of the 
labour force, when it has achieved sufficient 
power, with new pressures that become more 
intense if and when the lower strata join in this 
struggle. The inflationary spiral is then trig-
gered off, evidencing the crisis of the system; 
this is a type of'inflation which falls outside the 
scope of orthodox monetary prescriptions."'2 
Thus we reach the phase prior to the out-
break of the crisis, which will be tackled by 
resorting to force. 
"Inflation upsets the system and causes its 
social disintegration, and this sooner or later 
culminates in recourse to another of the State's 
institutional instruments: the use of force, de-
termined either by a decision on the part of 
those who hold it in their hands, or by the 
influence of political power at the summit of 
the system. The object of the use of force is to 
overrule or suppress the trade-union and politi-
cal power of the masses, thus seriously under-
mining their sharing capacity."13 
Queries 
This proposition, attractive in its clarity 
and simplicity, prompts the following ques-
tions, among others: 
M / / j if / . ,p. 181. 
12
 "Towards a theory of change", op. cit. 
1,1
 "Socio-economic structure and crisis of peripheral 
capitalism", op. cit., p. 181. 
(i) To what extent has higher growth of 
wages than of productivity been empirically 
confirmed in the countries of Latin America 
over relatively lengthy periods? Empirical evi-
dence is lacking, but it may nonetheless be 
stated that, in order for this to happen, the surp-
lus of unemployed labour must be small, the 
trade union organization must be powerful and 
the range of sectoral productivity levels must 
be broader than the sectoral wages spectrum. If 
this last condition is to be satisfied, the trade-
union movement must not only be powerful in 
given areas but must also be highly integrated 
at the national level, and this in the last analysis 
requires the existence of strong political orga-
nizations representing the labour force. 
It may be asserted a priori that, except in 
very special cases (perhaps in some countries 
in the Southern Cone during specific periods), 
these are not the situations that predominate in 
Latin American countries; and this will for the 
time being significantly restrict the validity of 
the hypothesis formulated. 
(ii) Even in any cases where evidence may 
have been found of a greater rise in wages than 
in productivity over a relatively protracted 
period, in keeping with what Prebiseh terms 
'advanced stages' of Latin American develop-
ment, the question arises of the importance of 
this tendency in explaining inflation, and, by 
extension, the crisis. 
As from the second half of the 1960s there 
is empirical evidence that in the developed 
countries wages have been growing faster than 
productivity. This tendency, reinforced by the 
increased tax burden and the deterioration in 
the terms of trade of the developed countries 
(aggravated from 1974 onwards by the rise in 
oil prices) would seem to have caused a drop in 
the rate of return, which, together with the per-
petuation of the previous factors, would seem 
to lie at the root of poor economic growth in the 
developed countries and to constitute one of 
the major reasons for the persistence of in-
flation.11 
" S e e 1\ McCrackcn ft «/., "Towards Full Employ-
ment and Price Stability'", OECD, Paris, June 1977; 
Edward F. Denison, "The Puzzling Drop in Productivity", 
The Brookings Bulletin, vol. XV, No. 2; Leonard Silk, "Pro-
ductivity and Inflation", The Sew York Times, 12 January 
1979; John Wyles, "Puzzlhigover Productivity", Financial 
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On previous occasions, a slowing of the 
growth rate led to greater slack in the labour 
market, and this also spread to the political 
sphere, thus generating appropriate conditions 
for a subsequent boom in private investment; 
this would seem to be the mechanism through 
which the system reacts to phases where wages 
grow faster than productivity. It is clear that, at 
least up to the present, this mechanism, which 
in fact is one of the factors accounting for the 
cyclical process in the developed countries, 
has not produced the type of crisis to which 
Prebisch refers in his work, i.e., the sort which 
would seem to have occurred in various Latin 
American countries. In the case of some 
countries of the region, the period of social 
tension prior to the crisis is characterized not 
only by an intensification of pressure from the 
labour force within the limited area of the dis-
tribution struggle, but also by more profound 
quest ioning of the organization of the social 
system, which does not discount changes in the 
ownership of the means of production. Perhaps 
for the very reason that this comprehensive 
challenge does not form part of the distribution 
struggle in the developed countries, the ma-
chinery for adjusting the system by cyclical 
means does not lead to the critical situations 
which are characteristic of Latin America's spe-
cial brand of capitalism. 
As regards inflation, it seems relatively 
clear that the distribution struggle is an impor-
tant factor, but by no means the only one. In 
Times, 15 February 1979; William B. Franklin, "The Inf-
lationary Threat on the Productivity Front", Business Out-
look, 2 February 1979, p. 29; "Public Expenditure Trends", 
O E C D , Paris, June 1978; R. Keohane, "Economic Activity, 
Inflation and the Role of the State", World Politics, Prince-
ton University Press, 1978; Martin Feldstein and Lawrence 
Summers , "Is the Rate oí Profit Falling?", Brookings Pap-
ers on Economic Activity, No. 1, 1977: Robert Eisner, 
"Capital Formation, Where, Why and How Much? Capital 
Shortage: Myth and Reality", in Capital Formation, vol. 
67, No. 1: William D. Nordhaus, "The Falling Share of 
Profits", BPEA, No. 1, 1974; Charles L. Schultze, "Falling 
profits, rising profit margins, and the full-employ ment pro-
fit rate", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 2, 
1975. Martín S. Feldstein and Michel Rothschild, "To-
wards an economic theory of replacement investment", 
Econométrica, vol. 42, No. 3, Evans ton, Illinois, May 1974; 
Arthur M. Okun and George L. Perry, "Notes and Numbers 
on the Profits Squeeze", Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, No. 3,1970. 
addition to the various structural and monetary 
factors which help to account for this phenome-
non, a persistence of inflationary pressures has 
been observed in recent years in some coun-
tries where force was resorted to, and where 
trade-union pressure was appreciably weak-
ened; and this would seem to confirm that the 
distribution struggle is part of a broad range of 
factors which contribute to inflation.15 
(iii) In so far as the author does not specify 
the country cases where his analysis would ap-
ply, the impression may be left that the aim is to 
propose an overall explanation for the crises 
experienced by the various Latin American 
countries. However, with respect both to the 
causes of these crises and to the models which 
culminated in them, there would seem to be a 
variety of situations which are not strictly in 
keeping with the propositions set out by the 
author in this regard. 
There are cases where industrial develop-
ment is intensified after the crisis, and others 
where it declines. In some instances the share 
of wages falls, while in others this tendency 
does not occur; in some, again, a drastic liber-
alization is provoked, while in others the pro-
tectionist policy remains in force; and there are 
also significant differences as regards the role 
played by the State. We are sure that this wide 
variety of situations has not escaped the author, 
though it may possibly be that the specific area 
which inspires Raúl Prebisch's thinking cor-
responds to some of the cases where the crisis 
has ocurred with the use of force. 
4. Concerning the neoclassical theories and 
their application to economic policy 
In his criticism of what some have termed a 
'popular* version of the neoclassical theories, 
Prebisch concentrates attention on the inequit-
able distribution of the fruits of technical 
progress. 
"First and foremost, the fruits of increased 
productivity are not reflected in a fall in prices 
1,r>Albert () . Hirschman, "The Social and Political 
Matrix of Inflation: Elaborations on the Latin American 
Expérience", The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 
New Jersey, prepared for The Brookings Project on the 
Politics and Sociology of Global Inflation, October 1978. 
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in so far as they have not been transferred to the 
earnings of the labour force, but remain in the 
hands of the owners of the means of production 
in the shape of a surplus."16 
In his argument he therefore emphasizes 
the importance of power in the distribution 
process. 
" In conclusion, the fruits of technical prog-
ress are not distributed according to marginal 
productivity, as is assumed in neoclassical 
theory, but mainly through the power of the 
various social groups."17 
In analysing the application of the neoclas-
sical theory to international trade, he intro-
duces institutional aspects such as the pre-
sence of the trans nationals and the behaviour of 
the centres vis-à-vis exports from the periph-
ery, emphasizing the functionality of the pre-
sent international division of labour in relation 
to the dominant interests both in the centre and 
in the periphery: 
"Thus, the classical theory of international 
trade has scientific validity given certain as-
sumptions, but it also served to formulate that 
outdated prescription for the international divi-
sion of labour which accomodated dominating 
interests both in the centre and the periph-
ery".18 
Queries 
In the Latin American countries applying 
an economic policy transparently and strictly 
based on neoclassical theory, one may observe, 
in addition to the distribution problems to 
which Prebisch refers, serious shortcomings as 
regards the level of activity and the very objec-
tive of attaining an efficient and stable position 
in the international market. In other words, 
there is firstly a problem of generating the pro-
duct, and secondly a problem of distributing it. 
In order to seek a better understanding of this 
situation, it may perhaps be necessary to raise 
the question of the validity of some of the hy-
potheses on which the said theory rests, the 
way in which its conclusions are interpreted for 
the purposes of devising economic policy, and 
l f i
' T h e neoclassical theories of economic liberalism", 
op. cit., p. 170. 
17
 Ibid., p. 173. 
18/£>/(/., p. 177. 
also the nature of the present international 
circumstances in which the developments un-
der discussion are taking place. This task is 
tackled, schematically and with no claim what-
ever to exhaustiveness, in the following para-
graphs. 
(i) There appears to be general agreement 
in government circles in Latin America that the 
problem of unemployment is one of the main 
challenges the region will face in the coming 
decades. Curiously, one of the hypotheses 
which serve as a basis for the neoclassical for-
mulation of the theory of international trade is 
precisely the existence of full employment; 
and its aim is to identify conditions as regards 
the organization of production and trade which 
will lead to a satisfactory solution for all coun-
tries: in other words, to identify in which ac-
tivities each country should specialize so as to 
make full use of the "abundant factors' with 
which nature has endowed it. In order to reach 
such a position sectoral changes are needed, 
but it is assumed that these occur in a situation 
characterized by full employment. In this re-
gard, one is struck by the surprise expressed in 
certain circles at the fact that the scrupulous 
application of the criteria derived from this 
theory does not lead to an appreciable increase 
in employment. They forget that, for the pur-
poses of the theory, this condition is satisfied 
from the outset. 
(ii) It is understandable that the nucleus of 
more advanced countries which have a com-
mon matrix of technology and help to ensure 
that it is constantly being developed should 
accept, at least at the intellectual level, the hy-
pothesis of international trade theory which 
holds that competing countries have similar 
production functions and that, accordingly, the 
sole problem is to select those items in each 
country that make most intensive use of the 
factors which, in each country, are relatively 
more abundant. This means that none of those 
involved would enjoy 'absolute advantages' 
over the others. As a result of Leontiefs fam-
ous empirical proof10 regarding the Hecksher-
19
 W. W. Leontief, "Domestic production and foreign: 
the American capital position re-examined", Proceedings 
of the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, Pa., 
No. 97, September 1953; W. W. Leontief, "Factor propor-
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Ohiin model and the later study by Arrow, 
Chenery, Minhas and Solow,20 as well as subse-
quen t research on the Hecksher-Ohlin-Sa-
muelson model when the production functions 
vary for the various countries, it has become 
clear that there is no justification for excluding 
the possibility that specific countries have 'ab-
solute advantages", which would explain how, 
whi le possessing an 'abundance of capital', 
they are in a position to export labour-intensive 
products.21 
If it is postulated that, in some Latin 
American countries, the disadvantages are 'ab-
solute' , the problem arises of defining the ac-
tion, mechanisms and periods of time neces-
sary for moving from this initial situation to 
another which combines advantages in some 
areas with disadvantages in others. 
In David Ricardo's classic version of the 
theory of international trade this problem was 
automatically resolved through the operation 
of the 'quantity theory of money': under this 
theory the country with the 'absolute disadvan-
tage', England, sold both wine and textiles at 
higher prices to Portugal, which would com-
pensate its deficit by paying in gold; this opera-
tion would tend to raise prices in Portugal and 
reduce them in England, so that a time would 
come when the product manufactured relative-
ly more efficiently in England would become 
competitive with the less efficient Portuguese 
product, and at that point the stage of'relative 
comparative advantages' would begin. 
It is difficult to imagine —though it is 
equal ly hard to exclude the possibility— that 
anyone could still maintain this to be the mech-
anism by which the countries of Latin America 
could move from a situation of'absolute disad-
vantage' to one of 'relative disadvantage' in 
their commercial transactions with the United 
tions and the structure of American trade: further theoreti-
cal and empirical analysis", Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics, No. XXXVIII, Amsterdam, November 1956; "Re-
ply", Review of Economics and Statistics (Supplement) 
No. XL, February 1958. 
2 0
 K. Arrow; H, B. Chenery; B. Minhas ¡ind R. W. Solow, 
"Capital Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency", 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 43, August 1961. 
21
 Harry Johnson, "International Trade: Theory", in 
David L. Sills (éd.), International Encyclopedia of the So-
cial Sciences, vol. 8, New York, Mat-mil Ian, 1968, pp. 83-95. 
States, the European Common Market and 
Japan. 
So far, the real mechanism has been exter-
nal borrowing, and its trends and implications 
suggest that the initial lag will not be elim-
inated by this means. There is sufficient evi-
dence to permit the assertion that, in the abs-
ence of internal transformations, borrowing 
basically results in a consolidation of the pre-
vailing distortions.22 
(iii) 'Efficiency' is a crucial concept in the 
'Latin American neoclassical debate'. Its for-
mulation ignores some empirical and everyday 
elements such as the decline in the flexibility 
of prices and wages; the general erosion of 
competition, and particularly competition 
through prices; systematic government inter-
vention; the obsolescence of the international 
monetary system and, above all, of the gold 
standard; and also the serious imperfections in 
information flows. 
However, perhaps the most serious omis-
sion is related to the economic policy objec-
tives for which this concept of efficiency would 
be functional; in our view these objectives 
should be incorporated within the concept of 
'efficiency'. 
In order to be described as efficient, ag-
riculture and industry would have to make a 
contribution through exports which, if the re-
maining components of the balance of pay-
ments remained constant, would make it possi-
ble to finance the volume of imports needed to 
reach satisfactory levels of growth in produc-
tion and employment, with an 'appropriate' 
level for the exchange rate. These qualifica-
tions with regard to levels of dynamism and 
exchange rates are of fundamental importance 
in emphasizing that what is involved is not just 
any kind of'efficiency', but an efficiency which 
is consistent with the overall objectives of 
economic policy. It is easy to give an impulse to 
an industrial sector that exports enough to fi-
nance the volume of imports required for a 
stagnant economy, or to one that substantially 
increases its exports of a broad range of items, 
2 2
 Anwar Shaikh, "On the Laws of International Ex-
change", Seminar on Economic Theory and Policies lor 
Growth, Mexico City, Centro de Investigación y Docencia 
Económicas A. C. (CIDE), 5-9 September 1977. 
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on the basis of a drastic devaluation which will 
produce serious secondary effects in the form 
of inflation and concentration of income.23 
The challenge is to raise efficiency, under-
stood here as being linked to long-term objec-
tives. Moreover, the importance of the conne-
xion between efficiency and dynamism arises 
from the fact that the existence of a relationship 
be tween growth in output, productivity and 
technological innovations has been empirical-
ly proved. 
(iv) Japan and Korea are perhaps the 
clearest historical examples of countries which 
rejected the 'p°PuJ a r ' version of the theory of 
comparative advantages, 'processing' its nor-
mative criteria into dynamic terms in keeping 
with their own situations. 
Perhaps the clearest and most direct ac-
count of Japan's industrialization after the Sec-
ond World War was given by the Vice-Minister 
for International Trade and Industry, Y. Ojimi: 
" T h e Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry decided to establish in Japan indus-
tries which require intensive employment of 
capital and technology, industries that in con-
sideration of comparative costs of production 
should be the most inappropriate for Japan, 
industries such as steel, oil refining, petro-
chemicals, automobiles, aircraft, industrial 
machinery of all sorts, and electronics, includ-
ing electronic computers. From a short-run, 
static viewpoint, encouragement of such in-
dustries would seem to conflict with economic 
rationalism. But, from a long-range viewpoint, 
these are precisely the industries where in-
come-elasticity of demand is high, technologi-
cal progress is rapid, and labour productivity 
rises fast. It was clear that without these indus-
tries it would be difficult to employ a popula-
tion of 100 million and raise their standard of li-
ving to that of Europe and America with light 
industries alone; whether right or wrong, Japan 
had to have these heavy and chemical indus-
tries. According to Napoleon and Clausewitz, 
the secret of a succesful strategy is the concen-
tration of fighting power on the main battle 
2 3
 See Ajit Singh, "North Sea Oil and the Reconstruc-
tion of U.K. Industry", a paper presented at the National 
Economic Conference on De-industrialization, London, 
Chatham House, 27 Junu 1978. 
grounds; fortunately, owing to good luck and 
wisdom spawned by necessity, Japan has been 
able to concentrate its scant capital in strategic 
industries."24 
The extent to which this national undertak-
ing, where participation in industry by foreign 
firms was minimal,25 has been successful in 
penetrating the international market is proved 
by the increasingly strong reaction on the part 
of the United States and Europe aimed at limit-
ing Japan's export drive. After 30 years of pro-
tection Japan subscribes to the declarations of 
the developed countries regarding the desira-
bility of liberalizing world trade, but does not 
allow that to prevent it from curbing exports to 
its own domestic market, by means of non-tariff 
protection.26 
In the case of Korea, in addition to the part 
played by the extensive battery of economic 
policy instruments, the specific conditions of 
authoritarianism and the geopolitical situation, 
a decisive role was enacted by the systematic 
and organic liaison between the executive 
branch and the country's leading groups, as 
well as by the bold, clear-cut strategic options 
adopted by Korea at the sectoral level.27 
Korea is now embarking resolutely on pro-
duction of capital goods, relying on direct sup-
port from the government and from the World 
Bank. 
2 4
 The Industrial Policy of Japan, Paris, Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1972, p . 15. 
2 5
 Between 1964 and 1970 the share of transnational 
corporations in Japanese industrial output rose from 2.5% 
to 3.0% . See T. Ozawa, Japan s Technological Challenge 
to the West, 1950-1974, MIT Press, 1974. 
2 B See Charles C. Hanson, "New E E C pressure on Ja-
pan to cut trade imbalance", Financial Times, January 
1979; "The Rise of Japanese Competition", Dollar and 
Sense, January 1979; "Yusuke Kashiwagi, the supreme 
competitor, Bank of Tokyo's President", Euromoney, Ja-
nuary 1979; "Japan Steps up its 'Invasion' of US", V. S. 
News & World Report, December 1978; Bruce Vandervort, 
"Japan won' t meet US trade demands", These Times, 
November-December 1978; "Scaling the 'buy Japanese' 
Wall", Business Week, December 1978; Mitsuo Ikeda, "Ja-
panese Electronic Cash Registers Score Worldwide Sales 
Victory", Business Japan, November 1978; Klaus R. 
Schroder, "Liberalization comes crawling in", Euromoney, 
January 1979. 
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 Despite what is often maintained, the involvement of 
foreign capital in Korean industry is relatively marginal. It 
has been estimated that no more than 5% of industrial 
assets have links with foreign capital. See Larry E. Westp-
hal, "The Republic of Korea's Experience with Export-Led 
Industrial Development", World Bank Reprint Series, 
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It would be a mistake to think that these 
two elements , selectivity and articulation, are 
exclusive to Asian societies because of the lat-
ter 's special features. The best demonstration 
of the fact that these two criteria are being ac-
tively applied in all the developed countries, 
with différent degrees of intensity and in diffe-
rent forms, is the emphatic support their gov-
ernments , in close co-ordination with their ma-
jor firms, are currently giving to the 'micro-
electronics ' sector, the crucial component of 
the new 'industrial revolution' now in its initial 
stage.28 
T h e confluence of the advances achieved 
in telecommunications, data processing and 
electronics, supported by the development of 
microprocessors, will make it possible to intro-
duce fundamental changes in the various pha-
ses of 'information technology', which in turn 
will lead to significant progress in communica-
tions, services and the capital goods and dur-
able consumer goods industries. These changes 
will have a direct impact on international trade, 
by substantially modifying the relative posi-
tions of the different countries.29 
What a contrast there is between these 
facts and the guiding principles in force in 
some of the countries of the region, which lay 
No. 54, p . 361. As far as exports are concerned, it has been 
est imated that the share of foreign firms stood at 11% in 
1979 and 14% in 1971. See Benjamin I. Cohen, "Compara-
tive behaviour of foreign and domestic export firms in a 
developing economy", Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, vol. 60,1973, pp. 190-197. 
2 8
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nomy", October 1979; C. G. Kean and Cullen R. Savage, 
"Micro-computers", Stanford Research Institute, Report 
570, California, USA, 1976; W. J. King, "G. E. Microproces-
sors", April 1977, pp. 32-36; Dr. N, Swords-Isherwood and 
P. Senker in Manufacturing Engineering, October 1978, 
pp. 64-72. 
2 y S e e "Competition, Technical Change and Man-
power in Electronic Capital Equipment: A Study of the UK 
Minicomputer Industry", SPRU Occasional Paper, Series 
No. 8, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, 
September 1978; J. M. Mc Lean and H. J. Rusch, "The 
Impact of the Microelectronics on the UK", SPRU Occasio-
nal Paper, Series No. 7, June 1978; B. J. Pond, "A Manage-
m e n t Gu ide to Computer-integrated Manufacturing", Iron 
Age, 10 April 1978; B. J. Pond, "The Road to CAD/CAM", 
Iron Age, 28 March 1977, pp. 37-44, 25 April 1977, pp. 
39-44, 30 may 1977, pp. 32-37,27 June 1977, pp. 31-34; B. J. 
Pond. "Machine Tools; A Time of Change", Iron Age, 5 
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down that, out of respect for theory, even ac-
tivities related to technological research must 
be subject to market laws, and that conse-
quently applied research institutions should be 
self-financing. Thus in the developed coun-
tries the heresy of government intervention 
and the voluntarism associated with sectoral 
selectivity continue to prevail, whereas some 
Latin American countries have already entered 
the ethereal and abstract phase where theoreti-
cal purity alone reigns supreme. 
There are so many and such varied cultural 
and historical differences between Japan, 
Korea and Latin America that the lessons de-
rived from this experience could hardly be me-
chanically transplanted to our region. Conse-
quently, these cases are mentioned only in or-
der to bring out the fact that when analysing the 
process of industrialization in Latin America, it 
is necessary to include protectionism among 
the elements which define the modus operandi 
of Latin America's industrial system. Protec-
tion is undoubtedly an important aspect; but 
some thought must be given to the type of pro-
duction it is sought to protect, the nature of the 
firms responsible for indiscriminate import 
substitution, the role played by the State, the 
sectors of society for which this industrializa-
tion is functional, and consistency between the 
nature of assimilated technical progress and 
the region's requirements and potentialities in 
terms of human and natural resources. 
(v) To the above considerations must be 
added the international situation, as the con-
crete framework for the political and economic 
design of this experiment in the strict applica-
tion of neoclassical theory. 
Declarations of principle are frequently 
adopted in the developed countries in favour of 
free trade, and concerning the need to reduce 
protectionist barriers both in those countries 
themselves and in the more advanced of the 
developing countries;30 nevertheless, they do 
not succeed in neutralizing pressure from the 
3 0
 "In the field of international trade, the challenge is to 
widen the area in which the GATT's principles are applied 
and in which fair and open competition is maintained. To 
that end, one U. S. objective will be to increase the number 
of countries that are subject to the rules of the GATT, 
including notably some of the rapidly industrializing 
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trade unions, from small and medium-sized in-
dustry and from the regions affected by the 
recession and inflation which have prevailed in 
recent years.31 
In the particular case of the United States, 
the magnitude of the external deficit has 
prompted the formulation of an export promo-
tion policy,32 accompanied by protectionist 
pressures, whereby it is hoped to reinforce the 
effects associated with the devaluation of the 
dollar.** 
It is therefore becoming obvious that the 
application of policies for the promotion of in-
dustrial exports is no mean task for the Latin 
American countries.34 
In general terms, then, it can be seen that 
the countries of the region are simultaneously 
facing problems such as the promotion of ex-
ports from the developed countries; pressures 
for a reduction in protection; and tendencies 
towards the granting of more and more facili-
ties for direct investment. Although it may ap-
pear paradoxical, it is precisely in this context 
that particular force is acquired by the criti-
countries that have become major factors in world mar-
kets." W. Michael Blumenthal "Steering in crowded wa-
ters", Foreign Affairs, vol. 56, No. 4, July 1978, p. 739. 
" For an important academic challenge to the liberali-
zation approach, which comes from a developed country 
with a weak relative position in international trade, see 
Francis Cripps and Wynne Godley, "Control of imports as a 
means to full employment and the expansion of world 
trade: the UK's case", Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
No. 2,1978, pp. 327-334; Francis Cripps, "Causes of growth 
and recession in world trade", Economic Policy Review, 
No. 4, March 1978; and Francis Cripps, "The money sup-
ply, wages and inflation", Cambridge Journal of Econo-
mics, No. 1, 1977, pp. 101-102. Trade union opposition is 
expressed as follows; "The problem of a greater rise in 
imports than in exports during the 1970s has modified the 
trade union attitude to trade". This new position is stated in 
the basically protectionist programme adopted by the AFL-
C I O Executive Council. See American Federationist, July 
1978. 
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cisms of Latin American industrialization 
which call for the elimination of protection and 
stress the need to reduce to a minimum the 
' interference' associated with government 
action. 
5. Concerning the proposal in "Towards 
a theory of change" 
In Prebisch's proposal two levels of abstraction 
may be distinguished. The first relates to the 
nature and fundamental objectives of the prop-
osal, while the second refers to its specific 
content in the economic area. 
As far as the nature of the proposal is con-
cerned, its essential objectives are the restora-
tion of political liberalism, equity and growth, 
with emphasis on the concerns and aspirations 
of that specific regional conglomerate which is 
known as Latin America. The task is "to com-
bine vigorous development, distributional 
equity and the advance and consolidation of 
the democratic process".35 
The core of the proposal appears to lie in 
what the author calls the 'social use of the surp-
lus': "The new option for the transformation of 
the system is based on the social use of the 
surplus, taking it from in whose hands most of 
the means of production are concentrated. Its 
purpose is to attack the major evils of the sys-
tem by collective discipline in distribution and 
accumulation"™ 
This proposition, which is strictly consis-
tent with the interpretation already advanced 
by the author in the articles previously com-
mented upon, focuses attention on the process 
of distribution of the surplus and its use for the 
purposes of growth, postponing for considera-
tion in subsequent studies the issue of the level 
and structure of the surplus generated. 
The proposal, which strictly speaking 
takes the form of a call for reflection, self-
criticism and seeking a consensus of the majo-
rity, might, because of the objectives pursued, 
arouse the attention and interest of broad sec-
tors of society. Perhaps the only groups that 
would stand aloof from this consensus would 
35 "Towards a theory of change", op, cit. 
36
 Ibid. 
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be the small butpowerfiil sectors which would 
be affected by this "collective discipline in dis-
tribution and accumulation". The author main-
tains that "part of the surplus of the major enter-
prises will be redistributed to the disadvan-
taged labour force. And this will make it possi-
ble for the private and social consumption of 
the latter sector to increase at the expense of 
privileged consumption".37 
As regards the specific meaning of the dis-
cipline of accumulation, it is "designed to raise 
the rate of accumulation substantially and equi-
tably. In order to achieve this aim all enterpri-
ses would have to increase the amount of the 
surplus devoted to accumulation at the expense 
of consumption on the part of the owners of the 
means of production".38 
Queries 
In respect of its specific economic content, 
the proposal is somewhat opaque. It is not clear 
what approach would be adopted to a number 
of issues to which the author himself attributes 
great importance in the interpretation which 
forms the background of the proposal: 
(i) The 'imitative' character which would 
appear to be associated with specific patterns of 
consumption, and accordingly with the struc-
ture of production and the presence of transna-
tional corporations, is a subject which is not 





means that the imitative character in question 
would remain unchanged, it would be interes-
ting to see the consequent repercussions on the 
model proposed; if, on the other hand, the imi-
tative character is to be modified, no indication 
is given of how this might be achieved; 
(ii) Nor is it specified what mechanism 
would be used to attain the objective of con-
verting the 'socialized' surplus into accumula-
tion. One can imagine the direct effect of this 
redistribution on the equity objective, but the 
feasibility of simultaneously fulfiling the aim 
of stepping up accumulation is less clear; 
(iii) In the interpretation of the present 
model, the author emphasizes the decisive im-
portance of subordination to the centres in the 
operation of'peripheral capitalism'. If this hy-
pothesis is accepted, it would appear natural to 
question what would be the effects of this 'so-
cialization of the surplus' on the position of the 
countries of the region in the world economy. 
We understand that Raúl Prebisch's pur-
pose —as he states himself in .the concluding 
pages of his latest articles— is to help to stimu-
late thought and discussion rather than to sup-
ply a finished product whose specific technical 
aspects meet strict standards. We consider that, 
both because of his contribution to interpreta-
tion, and because of the nature of the normative 
proposal, the author has fully achieved his ob-
ject. The brief comments outlined here are pre-
cisely a formulation of the moot points on 
which reflection is prompted by the articles 
concerned. 
